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6.1 Introduction
Electronic access to scholarly journals has become an important and
commonly accepted tool for researchers. Technological improvements
in,  and  decreased  costs  for,  communication  networks  and  digital
hardware  are  inducing  innovation  in  digital  content  publishing,
distribution, access and usage. Consequently, although publishers and
libraries face a number of challenges,  they also have promising new
opportunities. [1]  Publishers  are  creating  many  new  electronic-only
journals  on  the  Internet,  while  also  developing  and  deploying
electronic access to literature traditionally distributed on paper. They
are modifying traditional  pricing schemes and content  bundles,  and
creating new schemes to take advantage of the characteristics of digital
duplication and distribution.
The University of Michigan operated a field trial in electronic access
pricing and bundling called "Pricing Electronic Access to Knowledge"
(PEAK). We provided a host service providing access to roughly four
and a half years of content (January 1995 - August 1999) including all
of  Elsevier  Science's  approximately  1200  scholarly  journals.
Participating  institutions  had  access  to  this  content  for  over  18
months. [2] Michigan provided Internet-based delivery to over 340,000
authorized users at twelve campuses and commercial research facilities
across  the  U.S.  The  full  content  of  the  1200 journals  was  received,
catalogued and indexed, and delivered in real time. At the end of the
project the database contained 849,371 articles, and of these 111,983
had  been  accessed  at  least  once.  Over  $500,000  in  electronic
commerce was transacted during the experiment. For further details on
this project,  including the resources needed for implementation,  see
Bonn et al. (this volume).
We  elsewhere  describe  the  design  and  goals  of  the  PEAK  research
project (MacKie-Mason and Riveros (2000)). In MacKie-Mason et al.
(2000)  we  detail  the  pricing  schemes  offered  to  institutions  and
individual users. We also report and analyze usage statistics, including
some data on the economic response of institutions and individuals to
the different price and access options.
In this paper, we focus on an important behavior question: how much
does usage respond to various differences in user cost? We pay careful
attention to the effect of both pecuniary costs and non-pecuniary costs
such as time and inconvenience.
An interesting aspect of the PEAK project is the role of the library as
economic  intermediary  and  the  effects  of  its  decisions  on  the  costs
faced by end users. [3]  In the first  stage of  the decision process,  the
library  makes  access  product  purchasing  decisions.  These  decisions
then  have  a  potentially  large  effect  on  the  costs  that  users  face  in
accessing  particular  electronic  journal  articles,  whether  it  be  the
requirement that users obtain and use a password or pay a monetary
cost. The consumer then decides whether she will pay these costs to
access a given article.
The standard economic prediction is that a user will access an article if
the marginal benefit she expects from the article (i.e. the incremental
value) is greater than her marginal cost. Different users are going to
have  different  valuations  for  electronic  access  to  journal  articles.
Furthermore, even the same user will not place the same value on all
requested articles. Information regarding users' sensitivity to user cost
(known to economists as the elasticity of demand) for various articles is
important to an institutional decision-maker who wants to maximize,
or  at  least  achieve  a  minimally  acceptable  level  of  user  welfare. [4]
Demand elasticity information is also vital  to firms designing access
options and systems because design decisions will affect non-pecuniary
costs faced by the users, and thus overall demand for access.
It is well known that the usage of information resources responds to
the monetary cost users bear. We find that even modest per article fees
drastically  suppressed  usage.  It  is  also  true,  but  perhaps  less
appreciated, that non-pecuniary costs are important for the design of
digital information access systems. We find that the number of screens
users must navigate, and the amount of external information they must
recall and provide (such as passwords), have a substantial impact on
usage.  We  estimate  the  amount  of  demand  that  was  choked  off  by
successive  increases  in  the  user  cost  of  access.  Further,  we  find
preliminary evidence that users were more likely to bear these costs
when they are expected. Finally, given the access options and prices
offered in the PEAK experiment, we calculate the least costly bundles of
access  options  an  institution  could  have  purchased  to  meet  the
observed usage, and compare this to the actual bundles purchased in
each  year.  From  this  comparison  we  learn  about  the  nature  of
institutional forecasting errors, and the potential cost savings to them
from the detailed usage information of the sort provided by PEAK.
6.2 Access options offered
To  choose  which  access  products  (and  their  prices)  to  offer  PEAK
participants,  we  balanced  a  complex  set  of  considerations.  These
included the desire to study innovative access options,  the desire to
create substantial experimental variation in the data, and the need to
entice institutions to participate.  Hunter (this volume) gives a fuller
account of these deliberations. In the end, participating institutions in
the PEAK experiment were offered packages containing two or more of
the following three access products:
Traditional  Subscription:  Unlimited  access  to  the  material
available in the corresponding print journal.
1.
Generalized Subscription: Unlimited access (for the life of the
project) to any 120 articles from the entire database of currently
priced content. Articles are added to the generalized subscription
package as users request articles that were not already otherwise
paid for, until the subscription is exhausted. [5] Articles selected
for generalized subscriptions may be accessed by all authorized
users at that institution.
2.
Per Article: Unlimited access for a single individual to a specific
article. If an article is not available in a subscribed journal, nor a
generalized  subscription,  nor  are  there  unused  generalized
subscription tokens, then an individual may purchase access to
the article, but only for his or her use (for the life of the project).
3.
The  per-article  and  generalized-subscription  options  allow  users  to
capture  value  from  the  entire  corpus  of  articles,  without  having  to
subscribe to all journal titles. Once the content is created and added to
the server database, the incremental delivery cost (to the publisher and
system host) is approximately zero. Therefore, to create maximal value
from the content, it is important that as many users as possible have
access. The design of the pricing and bundling schemes affect both how
much value is delivered from the content (the number of readers) and
how that value is shared between the users and the publisher.
Generalized subscriptions may be thought of as a way to pre-pay (at a
discount) for interlibrary loan requests. One advantage of generalized
subscription purchases is that the "tokens" cost substantially less per
article than the per-article license price. Institutions did, however, need
to purchase tokens at the beginning of a year and thus bore some risk.
There is an additional benefit: unlike an interlibrary loan, all users in
the community have ongoing unlimited access to the articles obtained
via  generalized  subscription  token.  To  the  publisher,  generalized
subscriptions represent a committed flow of revenue at the beginning
of  each  year,  and thus  shift  some of  the  risk  to  the  users.  Another
benefit to the publisher, as noted by Hunter (this volume), is that that
they  open  up  access  to  the  entire  body  of  content  to  all  users.
Generalized subscriptions thus offer one method for the publisher to
increase  user  value  from  the  already  produced  content,  and  which
creates an opportunity to obtain greater returns from the publication of
that content.
Table 6.1: Access models
Institution ID Group Traditional Generalized Per Article
5, 6, 7, 8 Green X X
3, 9, 10, 11, 12 Red X X X
13, 14, 15 Blue X X
NOTE: An "X" indicates that this option was available to the institutions listed
in that row of the table.
Participating  institutions  were  assigned  randomly  to  one  of  three
different experimental treatments, which we labeled as the Red, Green
and Blue groups. Institutions in every group could purchase articles on
a  per-article  basis.  Those  in  the  Green  group  could  purchase
generalized subscriptions, while those in the Blue group could purchase
traditional subscriptions. Institutions in the Red group could purchase
all  types  of  access.  Twelve  institutions  participated  in  PEAK:  large
research  universities,  medium  and  small  colleges  and  professional
schools,  and corporate  libraries.  Table  6.1  shows the  distribution of
access models and products offered to the participating institutions.
6.3 Summary of user costs
The PEAK experiment was designed to assess user response to various
pricing and access  schemes for  digital  collections.  Since the content
was  traditional  refereed scholarly  literature,  we  implemented access
through the traditional intermediary: the research library. The reliance
on research libraries affected the design of the experiment and thus the
research  questions  we  could  investigate.  As  we  noted  above,  the
intermediary, by choosing the combination of access products available
to users, determines the costs faced by its users. The individual users
then  make  article-level  access  decisions. [6]  Thus,  there  are  two
different decision makers playing a role in access decisions. We must
take both into account when analyzing the usage data.
When confronted with the PEAK access options and prices, nearly all of
the participating libraries purchased substantial prepaid (traditional or
generalized  subscription)  access  on  behalf  of  their  users.  As  a
consequence,  relatively  few  users  were  faced  with  the  decision  of
whether or not to pay a pecuniary charge for article access. Although
we measured over 200,000 unique individual uses of the system, we
estimate that a user was asked to pay a pecuniary cost in only about
1200  instances.  Therefore  we  focus  as  much  on  user  response  to
non-pecuniary costs as to pecuniary costs.
Access  at  zero  user  cost.  Substantial  amounts  of  PEAK  content
were available at zero user cost. This content included:
all  "unmetered"  content,  which  included  articles  published  at
least  two  calendar  years  prior  as  well  as  all  non-full-length
articles;
articles  in  journals  to  which  the  institution  purchased  an
electronic traditional subscription; and
articles which had previously been purchased by a user at the
institution with a generalized subscription token.
All  such  access  required  authentication,  but  this  was  most  often
accomplished  automatically  by  system  verification  that  the  user's
workstation  IP  address  was  associated  with  the  participating
institution.  Thus,  most  such  authentications  required  no  user  time,
effort or payment, and the overall marginal user cost per access was
zero. [7]
Access at  medium user cost.  For  some access,  users  incurred a
higher  cost  because  they  were  required  to  enter  a  password.  The
transactions cost of password entry ranged from small to substantial.
In the worst case, the user needed to navigate elsewhere in the system
to fill out a form requesting a password, and then wait to receive it via
e-mail. Once received, the user had to enter the password. If the user
previously obtained a password, then the only cost to her was to find or
recall the password and enter it. Content accessible via password entry
included:
articles  in  journals  to  which  the  institution  did  not  have  a
traditional  subscription,  assuming  that  the  institution  had
generalized tokens available;
subsequent access to an article which an individual previously
purchased on a per-article basis.
Access at high user cost. If the institution did not have any unused
generalized subscription tokens, then content not available at zero cost
could be accessed by payment of  a $7 per-article fee.  The user who
wished to pay the per-article fee would also bear two non-pecuniary
costs:  (1)  password  recall  and  entry,  as  above  for  the  use  of  a
generalized subscription token, and (2) credit card recall and entry. [8]
In many cases, institutions subsidized, either directly or indirectly, the
per-article fee. Although subsidized, access of this type still resulted in
higher transactions costs. In the indirect subsidy case, a user needed to
submit for reimbursement. In the direct case, except at institution 15,
users  needed  to  arrange  for  the  request  to  be  handled  by  the
institution's interlibrary loan department.
Exceptions. Several of the access procedures—and thus users' costs
—were different at institutions 13 and 14. At both, per-article access for
all requests was paid (invisibly to the user) by the institution, so users
never faced a pecuniary cost. [9] At institution 14, a user still faced the
non-pecuniary cost of finding her password and entering it to access
"paid" content. [10] However, all users at institution 13 accessing from
associated IP addresses were automatically authenticated for all types
of access. Thus users at institution 13 could access all PEAK content at
zero  total  (pecuniary  and  non-pecuniary)  cost.  These  differences  in
access  procedures  were  negotiated  by  the  production  and  service
delivery  team  during  the  participant  acquisition  phase,  with  the
approval  of  the  research  team.  In  our  analyses  below  we  use  the
differences in user cost between these two institutions and the others
as a source of additional experimental variation.
Complexity.  From the  description above,  it  might  appear  that  the
PEAK access  program was much more complicated than one would
expect to find in production services. If so, then our results might not
generalize readily to these simpler production alternatives.
In fact, most of the complexity is at the level of the experiment, and as
such creates a burden on us (the data analysts), and on readers, but not
on  users  of  the  PEAK system.  Because  this  was  an  experiment,  we
designed  the  program  to  have  different  treatments  for  different
institutions. We had to keep track of these differences, but users at a
single institution did not need to understand the full project (indeed,
they  were  not  explicitly  informed  that  different  variations  of  PEAK
were  available  elsewhere).  In  most  cases  they  did  not  even need to
understand all three access options, because most institutions had only
two options available to them.
Among  our  three  access  options,  the  traditional  subscription  and
per-article fee options were designed to closely mimic familiar access
schemes for  printed journals,  and as  such they did not  cause much
confusion.  The  generalized  subscription  was  novel,  but  the  details
largely were transparent to end users: they clicked on an article link,
and either it was immediately available, or they were required to enter
a password, or they were required to pay a per-article fee. Whether the
article was available through a traditional or generalized subscription
was not relevant to individual users. Thus, to the user the access system
had almost identical complexity to existing systems: either an article is
available in the library or not, and if  not the user can request it  via
interlibrary  loan  (and/or  with  a  per-article  fee  from  a  document
delivery service).
The librarians making the annual PEAK purchasing decisions needed
to  understand  the  differences  between  traditional  and  generalized
subscriptions of course. We prepared written explanatory materials for
them,  and  provided  pre-purchase  and  ongoing  customer  support  to
answer any questions. In section 6.6 below we discuss some evidence
on how learning about the system changed behavior between the first
and second year, but we did not observe any significant effects we could
attribute to program complexity.
6.4 Effects of user cost on access
In this section, we measure the extent to which user costs to access
PEAK content affected the quantity and composition of articles actually
accessed.  Clearly  the  costs  and  benefits  of  accessing  the  same
information  via  other  means,  particularly  via  an  institution's  print
journal holdings, will have an enormous impact on a user's willingness
to bear costs associated with PEAK access. We do not explicitly model
these costs, although we do control for them at an institutional level.
Kingma (this volume) provides estimates of some costs associated with
information access via several non-electronic media.
As noted above, user costs for accessing PEAK content depended on a
variety  of  factors.  One  factor  is  the  type  of  content  requested
("metered" versus "unmetered"). Looking only at metered content, the
pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs associated with access depended in
large  part  on  the  access  products  purchased by  a  user's  institution.
Further,  the  access  costs  faced  by  users  within  a  given  institution
depended on the specific products selected by an institution (i.e. the
specific  journals  to  which  an  institution  holds  a  traditional
subscription,  and  the  number  of  generalized  subscription  tokens
purchased), individual actions (whether a password had already been
obtained)  and  also  on  the  actions  of  other  users  at  the  institution
(whether a token had already been used to purchase a requested article,
and how many tokens remain). In the following sections, we estimate
the effects of these incremental costs on the quantity and composition
of metered access.
Non-pecuniary costs
To gauge the impact of user cost of usage on aggregate institutional
access, we compared the access patterns of institutions in the Red
group  with  those  in  the  Blue  group.  Red  institutions  had  both
generalized  and  traditional  subscriptions  available;  Blue  had  only
traditional. Users at both institutions could obtain additional articles
at  the  per-article  price.  We  constructed  a  variable  we  call
"Normalized  Paid  Accesses"  to  measure  the  number  of  "paid"
accesses  to  individual  articles  (paid  by  generalized  tokens  or  by
per-article fee) per 100 unmetered accesses, normalized to account
for the number of traditional subscriptions. Adjusting for traditional
subscriptions accounts for the amount of prepaid content provided
by the user's institution; adjusting for unmetered accesses adjusts for
the size of the user community and the underlying intensity of usage
in that community. [11]
Table 6.2:Normalized paid access per 100 unmetered accesses, by
institution.
Institution Accessgroup











NOTE: Average not reported for Blue institutions because of variations in
experimental conditions; see text for details.
We  use  our  statistic,  Normalized  Paid  Accesses,  as  a  measure  of
relative (cross-institution) demand for paid access. We present the
statistic  in  Table  6.2.  Even  after  controlling  for  the  size  of  an
institution's  subscription  base  and  the  magnitude  of  demand  for
unmetered content,  paid demand differed among institutions with
the same access products. This suggests that there are institution-
specific attributes affecting demand for paid access. It is also possible
that we incompletely control for subscription size. One possibility is
that the number of traditional subscriptions affects the cost a user
expects to have to pay for an article before the actual cost is realized.
Users  at  an  institution  with  a  large  traditional  subscription  base,
such as institution 3, would have had a lower expected marginal cost
for access as a large percentage of the articles are accessible at zero
cost. Some users at these institutions might attempt to access articles
via PEAK, expecting them to be free,  while not willing to pay the
password  cost  when  the  need  arises.  This  difference  between
expected and actual marginal cost may be important; we return to
this point later.
We can make some interesting comparisons between institutions in
the Red group and those in the Blue group. While institution number
13, as a member of the Blue group, only had traditional subscriptions
and per-article access available, users at this institution did not need
to authenticate for any content, and thus faced no marginal cost in
accessing any paid content. Most users at Red institutions faced the
cost  of  authenticating  to  spend  a  token. [12]  We  would  therefore
expect a higher rate of paid access at institution 13, and this is in fact
the case.
Paid  access  at  institution  14  was  similarly  subsidized  by  the
institution. However, in contrast to institution 13, authentication was
required. Thus the marginal user cost of paid access at institution 14
was  exactly  the  same  as  at  the  Red  institutions.  We  therefore
expected that demand for paid access would be similar. This is in fact
the case: Normalized Paid Access is 15.1 at both. Finally, per-article
access for users at institution 15 was not automatically subsidized.
Thus,  users  faced  very  high  marginal  costs  for  paid  content.  In
addition to the need to authenticate with a password, users at this
institution  needed  either  to:  a)  pay  the  $7.00  per-article  fee  and
enter their credit card information; or b) arrange for the request to
be  handled  via  the  institution's  interlibrary  loan  department.  In
either case, the user cost of access was higher than password only,
and, as we expected, the rate of paid access was much lower than in
the Red group.







Blue: Credit Card (Inst. 15) -280.490* -270.879*
(37.627) (35.508)
Red + Institution 14 -58.999* -57.764*
(7.900) (7.186)
Out of Tokens -25.070* -25.665*
(1.635) (2.533)
Graduate Students/Faculty Ratio 43.821* 41.748*
(7.301) (6.912)
Percentage Engineering, Science and
Medicine -225.913* -215.767*
(7.535) (36.553)
Sample Size 530 530
R2 0.171 0.229
NOTE: Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Dependent variable is weekly normalized paid access per 100 free accesses.
* Significant at the 99% level.
Table 6.3 summarizes the results from a multiple regression estimate
of the effects of user cost on access. We controlled for differences in
the graduate student / faculty ratio and the percentage of users in
Engineering,  Science  and  Medicine. [13]  The  dependent  variable,
Paid accesses per 100 unmetered accesses, controls for learning and
seasonality  effects.  We  thus  see  the  extent  to  which  paid  access,
starting from a baseline of access to paid content at zero marginal
user  cost,  falls  as  we  increase  marginal  costs.  Imposition  of  a
password requirement reduces paid accesses by almost 60 accesses
per  100  unmetered  accesses  (Red  and  institution  14),  while  the
depletion  of  (institution-purchased)  tokens  results  in  a  further
reduction of approximately 25 accesses (per 100 unmetered).
We use the distinction between metered and unmetered access to
further test the extent to which increased user costs throttle demand.
As a reminder, full-length articles from the current year are metered:
either the institution or the individual must pay a license fee to gain
access.  Other  materials  (notes,  letters  to  the  editor,  tables  of
contents, and older full-length articles) are not metered: anyone with
institutional access to the system can access this content after the
institution pays the institutional participation license fee.  Some of
the  unmetered  content  comes  from  journals  that  are  covered  by
traditional subscriptions, some from journals not in subscriptions.
We calculate  the  ratio  of  this  free  content  accessed from the  two
subsets  of  content.  If  we  make  the  reasonable  assumption  that,
absent differential user costs, the ratio of metered content from the
two subsets would be the same as the ratio of unmetered content,
then we can estimate what the demand would be for metered content
outside of paid subscriptions if that content were available at zero
user cost (e.g., if the institution added the corresponding journals to
its traditional subscription base). Our estimate is calculated as:


















3 1998 21.1% 11.1% 0 6.69%
10 1998 146.2% 45.4% 0 13.5%
11 1998 16.4% 8.81% 0 2.6%
12 1998 83.3% 51.7% 0 7.14%
13 1998 125.9% 98.8% 0 100.0%
14 1998 79.3% 54.5% 0 44.4%
15 1998 0.00% 22.2% 1 8.06%
3 1999 31.4% 19.1% 0 10.4%
10 1999 123.4% 43.9% 0 13.4%
11 1999 20.8% 18.5% 0 14.1%
13 1999 77.7% 100.0% 0 100.0%
14 1999 56.7% 63.2% 0 17.8%
15 1999 19.5% 12.2% 1 2.39%
"Percent  free  access  password  authenticated"  indicates  the  percentage  of
times that users accessing free material were already password authenticated
(which isn't in fact necessary for free accesses).
"Credit card required" means the user was required to pay a per-article fee.
In Table 6.4 we present actual paid access (when customers face the
actual user cost) as a percentage of predicted access (at zero user
cost) for all institutions that had traditional subscriptions in a given
year. All observations except three (institutions 10 and 13 in 1998,
and institution 10 in 1999) show actual access substantially below
predicted when users bear the actual user cost. We conjecture that
the surprising result for institution 10 might be partially due to the
fact  that  they  had  the  fewest  traditional  subscriptions.  Because
relatively little was available at zero user cost, users at this institution
might have expected to bear the user cost (password recollection and
entry in this case) for every access. If this were the case, then our
method of predicting access at zero user cost is biased and the results
for institution 10 are not meaningful. As for institution 13, recall that
its  users  in  fact  faced  no  incremental  user  cost  to  access  paid
materials.  We  thus  expect  its  paid  accesses  to  be  closer  to  that
predicted for zero user cost, and are not surprised by this result.
Though not related to our focus on user cost,  there are two other
statistical  results  reported  in  Table  6.4  that  bear  mention.  First,
usage is substantially, and statistically significantly higher when the
graduate student / faculty ratio is higher. It is not implausible that
graduate students make more frequent use of the research literature,
reading  more  articles  while  taking  classes  and  working  on  their
dissertations, than more established scholars. This may also reflect
life cycle differences in effort and productivity. However, it  is also
possible  that  a  higher  graduate  student  ratio  is  proxying  for  the
intensity of research (by both graduate students andfaculty) at the
institution, which would be correlated with higher access.
The  other,  and  more  surprising  result  is  that  the  higher  is  the
percentage of  engineering,  science and medicine (STM) users,  the
lower is  usage,  by a large and statistically significant amount.  We
cannot be sure about the interpretation of this result, either. We were
surprised because the Elsevier catalogue is especially strong in STM,
reflected  in  breadth,  depth  and  quality  of  content.  Perhaps  the
nature of study and research in STM calls for less reading of journal
articles, but this conjecture cannot be tested without further data.
For  all  other  institutions  we  generally  see  that  the  user  costs
associated with paid access caused an appreciable reduction in the
number  of  paid  articles  demanded.  We also  present  in  Table  6.4
factors  which  we  believe  help  explain  this  shortfall,  namely  the
percentage of free access that is password authenticated, whether or
not a credit card is required for all paid access, and the rate at which
passwords were entered for paid access when prompted.
Table 6.5: Estimation results of effects of user cost on actual paid
accesses as percent of predicted accesses
Independent variable Coefficient (standard error)
Percent Free Psswd. Auth. 2.12*
(.45)
Prompted Login Percent -1.05**
(.54)




NOTE: Standard errors shown in parentheses. Dependent variable is actual
paid access as a percentage of predicted.
*Significant at the 99% level; **Significant at the 95% level.
In Table 6.5 we summarize the results from the estimation of the
effects of user cost on actual paid access as a percentage of predicted
accesses.  Despite  the  small  sample  size,  the  results  clearly
demonstrate that, as we increase the number of individuals who can
access paid content  without  additional  marginal  costs  (proxied by
the  percent  of  free  access  that  is  password  authenticated,  which
indicates  that  the  password user  cost  has  already been incurred),
more paid access is demanded. The dummy variable for credit card
required (for per-article payment) is not significant, but there was
almost  no  variation  in  the  sample  from  which  to  measure  this
effect. [14] The coefficient for the percent of prompted users who log
in is of the wrong sign to support our hypothesis: we expected that
the  higher  the  number  of  users  who  are  willing  to  bear  the
non-pecuniary costs of login, the higher would be the access to paid
material.
Pecuniary costs
If an institution did not purchase any, or depleted all of its tokens, a
user wanting to view a paid article not previously accessed had three
choices. [15] She could pay $7.00 to view the article, and also incur
the  non-pecuniary  cost  of  entering  credit  card  information  and
waiting  for  verification.  If  the  institution  subscribed  to  the  print
journal,  she  could  use  the  print  journal  article  rather  than  the
electronic  product.  She  could  also  request  the  article  through  a
traditional  interlibrary  loan,  which  also  involves  higher  non-price
costs (effort  to fill  out the request  form, and waiting time for the
article to be delivered) than spending a token. [16]
Due to details of the system design, we are unable to determine the
exact  number of  times that  users  were faced with the decision of
whether or not to enter credit card information in order to access a
requested article.  We were  able to identify in the transaction logs
events  consistent  with  the  credit  card  decision  (hereafter  we  call
these "consistent events"). These consistent events are, however, a
noisy signal for the actual number of times users faced this decision.
We used evidence from the experimental variation to estimate the
actual  rate  of  requests  for  credit  card  payment.  In  some  months
some institutions had unused tokens and thus there were nocredit
card  (per-article)  purchases,  since  unused  tokens  are  always
employed  first.  For  these  months  we  divided  the  number  of
consistent events by the number of access requests handled by the
system for that institution, to obtain a measure of the baseline rate of
consistent events that are not actual credit card requests. For each
institution that did deplete its supply of tokens, we then subtracted
this  estimated  baseline  rate  from  the  total  number  of  consistent
events to measure requests for credit card payment. For institutions
that never had tokens, we use the weighted average of the estimated
baseline rates for institutions with tokens.
Table  6.6:  Credit  card  payments  as  a  percent  of  requests,
estimated from transaction log evidence
Institution Estimated  Credit  CardRequests
Credit  Card
Payments Percent
3 53 13 25.5%
6 260 194 74.6%
9 190 1 0.5%
11 562 61 10.9%
15 137 73 53.3%
In Table 6.6 we present the number of actual payments as a percent
of  estimated  requests  for  credit  card  payments.  The  relative
percentages are consistent with our intuition. Institutions 6 and 15
never had any tokens. We thus expect that users at these institutions
expected a relatively high cost of article access, and would not bother
accessing  the  system  or  searching  for  articles  if  they  were  not
prepared  to  pay  fairly  often. [17]  Among  the  institutions  at  which
tokens  were  depleted,  the  payment  rate  is  appreciably  higher  at
institutions 3 and 11, which is consistent with the fact that at these
institutions  the  user  could  make  an  interlibrary  loan  request  for
articles through PEAK, and the institution would pay the per article
charge on behalf of the user.
We gain further understanding of the degree to which differences in
user cost affects the demand for paid article access by looking at only
those  institutions  that  depleted  their  supply  of  tokens  at  various
points throughout the project. There were three institutions in this
category: institution 3 ran out of tokens in November 1998 and again
in July 1999; institution 11 in May 1999; and institution 9 in June
1999.
For institutions that had tokens available at certain times, we can
estimate the number of credit card requests (by PEAK, to the user)
based on the number of tokens spent per free access. If we make the
assumption that this rate of token expenditure would have remained
constant had tokens still been available, we can estimate the number
of credit card requests to be equal to the estimated number of tokens
that would have been spent had tokens been available.
Table  6.7:  Credit  card  payments  as  a  percent  of  requests,
estimated from token expenditure rate
Institution Credit Card Requests Credit Card Payments Percent
3 128 13 10.2%
9 366 1 0.3%
11 1128 61 5.4%
In Table 6.7 we present the rate of credit card payments as estimated
from  the  rate  of  token  expenditure.  The  relative  percentages  are
consistent  with  our  previous  estimates  for  these  institutions.  The
estimated  number  of  requests  for  credit  card  payment  are  about
twice as high as the estimates in Table 6.6. One possible explanation
is that when users know they are going to face a credit card payment
request (tokens have run out, which they learn on their first request
for an article that is not prepaid) they may make fewer attempts to
access  material,  which would be  another  measure  of  the  effect  of
transaction payments on service usage.









1998 1999 1999 1999
30 days prior 13.6 18.4 20.2 16.0
30 days after 0.25 0.29 0.00 0.35
Percentage
Decrease -98.2% -98.4% -100.0% -97.8%
NOTE: Units: Normalized paid access per 100 unmetered accesses.
To further quantify the decrease in demand for paid access resulting
from a depletion of tokens, in Table 6.8 we present the normalized
accesses of metered content per hundred accesses of free content at
these institutions for the 30 days prior and subsequent to running
out of tokens. Usage plummeted after tokens ran out and users were
required to pay per article for access to metered content.
Summary: Effects of user costs
The results we presented in this section demonstrate that increases
in  user  costs  substantially  diminish  demand for  paid  content.  In
particular,  the decisions made by thousands of  users demonstrate
that non-pecuniary costs, such as password use, have an impact on
demand that is of the same order of magnitude as direct monetary
costs.
6.5 Effects of Expected User Cost on Access
As we showed in Table 6.4, at most institutions actual paid usage when
users  directly  paid  the  user  cost  was  substantially  below  predicted
usage  with  zero  user  costs.  Users  at  institution  10  were  notable
exceptions. We hypothesized that users at this institution might have
expected to bear more cost, and they were willing to pay more often
when confronted with costs. We explore this hypothesis in this section.
According to our hypothesis, the frequency with which users are asked
to pay for content will affect a user's ex ante estimation of how much
she will need to pay. This effect on her estimate can stem from either
her previous direct experience, or through "word of mouth" learning. It
is our hypothesis that the expected access cost affected the probability
that a user paid for access when requested.
We  have  two  conjectures  about  user  behavior  that  would  cause
willingness to pay to depend on prior expectations about cost. The first
concerns an induced selection bias.  The higher the expected cost  to
access an article, the fewer the users who will even attempt to access
the  information  via  PEAK.  In  particular,  users  with  a  low expected
benefit for an article will generally be less likely to use PEAK at all. The
result would be that those who do use PEAK are more likely to pay
necessary article access fees. Our second conjecture is that context of
the request for payment matters, i.e. there is a "framing" effect. It is
possible that if a user is habituated to receiving something for free, she
will be resistant to paying for that object, even if her expected benefit is
greater than the actual cost. [18] Unfortunately, the data that we have
do not permit us to distinguish between these two scenarios.
Table 6.9: Effect of subscription coverage on paid access
Institution
Normalized  paid
accesses  per  100
unmetered
Estimated





3 13.5 83.6% 8.48%
10 31.7 6.9% 13.5%
11 7.6 74.2% 2.6 %
12 26.4 11.1% 7.1%
14 15.1 31.4% 29.6%
NOTE: See text for more complete definitions of the variables.
Correlation coefficients: Paid access and % of unmetered in subscription base:
-0.87
Prompted login and % of unmetered in subscription base: -0.36
In  Table  6.9  we  present  some  evidence  that  users'  expectations  do
matter. To explore this hypothesis, we rely on the difference in user
cost between accesses to traditional subscription material (no password
required) and generalized subscription material (password required).
Therefore,  we  report  all  institutions  at  which  password  entry  was
required  in  order  to  spend  a  generalized  subscription  token,  plus
institution 14, at which users faced similar costs. We use accesses of
unmetered  content—which  has  zero  incremental  user  cost  for  all
material,  whether  in  traditional  subscriptions  or  not—as  our
comparison benchmark. In the second column we report the forecast of
unmetered  content  accesses  that  were  contained  within  the
institution's traditional subscription base. We use this as an estimate of
the  user's  expected  user  cost  of  access.  For  example,  if  75%  of
unmetered access came from traditional subscription material, then we
estimate that  the user also expects  75% of  her demand for  metered
material  to  be from traditional  subscriptions (with zero incremental
user cost), and only 25% of requests for metered material to involve the
password user cost (for generalized subscription content).
In the last two columns we present measures of user willingness to bear
user cost. The institution's normalized paid access is a scaled measure
of the rate at which (metered) generalized subscription material was
accrued  (and  thus  how  soon  the  password  cost  was  incurred).  The
pecent  who  login  when  requested  is  another  measure  of  user
willingness to bear the password user cost.
The  data  are  consistent  with  our  hypothesis  that  users  with  lower
expected access costs (see column 2) will be less likely to bear the user
cost  of  password  retrieval  and  entry.  The  correlation  between  the
expected rate of zero-cost access and normalized paid access is -0.87.
We also see a negative correlation of -0.36 between the expected rate of
zero cost access and willingness to enter a password when requested.
6.6 Improving library budgeting with usage information
Librarians are in an unenviable position when they select subscriptions
to  scholarly  journals. [19]  They  must  determine  which  journals  best
match  the  needs  and  interests  of  their  community  subject  to  two
important  constraints.  The  budgetary  constraint  has  become
increasingly binding because renewal costs have risen faster than serial
budgets  Haar  (1999).  The  second  constraint  is  that  libraries  have
incomplete  information  about  community  needs.  A  traditional  print
subscription forces libraries to purchase publisher-selected bundles of
information (the journal), while users are interested primarily in the
articles therein. Users only read a small fraction of articles, [20] and the
library generally lacks information about which articles the community
values. Further compounding the problem, a library makes an ex ante
(before  publication)  decision about  the value of  a  bundle,  while  the
actual value is realized ex post.
The PEAK electronic access products relaxed these constraints. First,
users had low-cost access to articles in journals to which the institution
did not subscribe. This appeared to be important: at institutions that
purchased traditional subscriptions, 37% of the most accessed articles
in  1998  were  outside  the  institution's  traditional  subscription  base.
This  figure  was  50% in  1999.  Second,  the  transaction  logs  that  are
feasible  for  electronic  access  allowed  us  to  provide  libraries  with
monthly reports not only on which journals their community valued,
but also which articles. Detailed usage reporting should enable libraries
to  provide  additional  value  to  their  communities.  They  can  better
allocate  their  serials  budgets  to  the  most  valued journal  titles  or  to
other access products.
In this section we present analyses of the extent to which improved
information available from an electronic usage system could lead to
reduced expenditures and better service.
Improved budgeting with improved usage forecasts
We first estimate an upper bound on how much the libraries could
benefit from better usage data. We analyze each institution's accesses
to determine what would have been its optimal bundle if it had been
able to perfectly forecast which material would be accessed. We then
calculate how much this bundle would have cost the institution, and
compare  this  perfect  foresight  cost  with  the  institution's  actual
expenditures. Obviously even with extensive historical data, libraries
would not be able to perfectly forecast future usage, so the realized
efficiencies from better usage data would be less. Below we analyze
how the libraries used the information from 1998 to change their
purchasing decisions in 1999.
We present these results by access product in Table 6.10. We found
that  actual  expenditures  were  markedly  higher  than  optimal
purchases in 1998. In particular,  institutions in the Red and Blue
groups purchased far more traditional subscriptions than would be
justified if  they had perfect  foresight.  Most  institutions purchased
more generalized subscriptions than would have been optimal with
perfect foresight. We believe that much of the budgeting "error" can
be explained by a few factors:
First,  institutions  overestimated  demand  for  access,
particularly for journals for which they purchased traditional
subscriptions. [21]
Second,  institutional  practices,  such  as  "use  it  or  lose  it"
budgeting and a preference for fixed, predictable expenditures,
might  have  affected  decisions.  A  preference  for  predictable
expenditures would induce a library to rely more heavily on
traditional  and  generalized  subscriptions,  and  less  on
reimbursed  individual  article  purchases  or  interlibrary
loan. [22]  However,  Kantor  et.  al.  (2001)  Kantor  et  al.  (this
volume)  report  the  opposite:  that  libraries  dislike  bundles
because  they  perceive  them  as  forcing  expenditures  for
low-value items.
Third,  because  demand  foresight  is  necessarily  important,
libraries might want to "over-purchase" to provide insurance
against  higher  than  expected  usage  demand.  Of  course,
per-article  purchases (possibly reimbursed to users)  provide
insurance (as does an interlibrary loan agreement),  but at a
higher  cost  per  article  than  pre-purchased  generalized
subscription tokens, or than traditional subscriptions.
Table 6.10: Actual versus optimal expenditures per access product
for 1998-1999
Access Product Totals
Traditional Generalized Per Article
Year Instid Actual Optimal Actual Optimal Actual Optimal Actual Optimal
1998 3 25,000 17,000 2,740 3,836 7 133 27,747 20,969
5 N/A 0 15,344 6,576 0 169 15,344 6,745
6 N/A 0 0 548 672 0 672 548
7 N/A 0 24,660 12,604 0 0 24,660 12,604
8 N/A 0 13,700 2,740 0 0 13,700 2,740
9 0 556 13,700 6,576 0 56 13,700 7,188
10 4,960 323 8,220 7,672 0 483 13,180 8,478
11 70,056 5,217 2,192 13,700 0 84 72,248 19,001
12 2,352 107 2,192 1,096 0 98 4,544 1,301
13 28,504 139 N/A 0 952 1,120 29,456 1,259
14 17,671 0 N/A 0 294 504 17,965 504
15 18,476 0 N/A 0 0 1,176 18,476 1,176
1999 3 12,500 10,528 2,740 1,096 84 0 15,324 11,624
5 N/A 0 8,768 2,740 0 399 8,708 3,139
6 N/A 0 0 548 686 0 686 548
7 N/A 0 10,960 9,864 0 511 10,960 10,375
8 N/A 0 6,028 5,480 0 462 6,028 5,942
9 0 278 7,124 6,576 7 182 7,131 7,036
10 2,480 1,401 8,768 6,576 0 210 11,247 8,187
11 0 576 4,384 2,740 427 532 4,559 3,848
12 0 0 1,644 548 0 539 1,644 1,087
13 9,635 7,661 N/A 0 19,964 7,175 29,599 14,836
14 0 0 N/A 0 623 623 623 623
15 8,992 1,058 N/A 0 511 1,694 9,502 2,751
Table 6.11: Predicted vs. actual direction of expenditure change
for  traditional  and  generalized  subscriptions  (by  institution,
1998-99).
Change in expenditure 1998-99
Traditional Generalized
Institution Predicted Actual Predicted Actual
3 - 0 + +
5 N/A N/A - -
6 N/A N/A + 0
7 N/A N/A - -
8 N/A N/A - -
9 + 0 - -
10 - 0 - +
11 - - + +
12 - - - +
13 - 0 N/A N/A
14 - 0 N/A N/A
15 - + N/A N/A
NOTE: Predicted change direction is based on whether institution over- or
under-purchased that product in 1999.
"0"  indicates  no  change;  "N/A"  indicates  the  access  product  was  not
available to that institution; "+" and "-" indicate an increase and decrease,
respectively.
We also analyzed changes in purchasing behavior from the first to
the  second  year  of  the  project.  The  PEAK  team  provided
participating  institutions  with  regular  reports  detailing  usage.  We
hypothesized  that  librarian  decisions  about  purchasing  access
products  for  the  second  year  (1999)  might  be  consistent  with  a
simple learning dynamic: increase expenditures on products under-
purchased  in  1998  and  decrease  expenditures  on  products  they
over-purchased  in  1998.  For  each  institution  we  compared  the
direction of 1998-99 expenditure change for each access product to
the change we hypothesized. [23] We present the results in Table 6.11.
Six  of  the  nine  institutions  adjusted  the  number  of  generalized
subscriptions in a manner consistent with our hypothesis. [24] Fewer
adjusted traditional subscriptions in the predicted direction. Two of
the seven institutions that purchased more traditional subscriptions
in  1998  than  was  ex  post  optimal  then  decreased  the  number
purchased in 1999. Indeed, only three of the eight institutions made
any  changes  at  all  to  their  traditional  subscription  lineup.  This
suggests an inertia that cannot be explained solely by direct costs to
the  institution.  Perhaps  libraries  see  a  greater  insurance  value  in
having certain titles freely available through traditional subscriptions
than from having generalized subscription tokens available that can
be used on articles from any title. Generalized subscription tokens
are  also  more  expensive  per  article  than  traditional  subscription
prices,  so  the  libraries  are  purchasing  more  potential  usage  with
their budgets. Another explanation might be that libraries were more
cautious about purchasing generalized subscriptions because it was a
less familiar product.
Table 6.12: Estimation results for forecast error











NOTE: Dependent variable is forecast error (in percent).
No constant term is included in the regressions.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
* Significant at the 99% level.
We performed a regression analysis to assess the differences between
apparent over-purchasing in 1998 and 1999. Our dependent variable
was  the  difference  between  the  perfect  forecast  expenditure  and
actual expenditure, which we call the "forecast error". In Table 6.12
we report the effects of learning (the change in the error for 1999)
and the average differences across experimental groups. The perfect
foresight overspending over the life of the project averaged between
53%  (Red)  and  86%  (Blue).  However,  the  overspending  was  on
average  36  percentage  points  lower  in  1999.  This  represents  a
reduction of about one-half in perfect foresight overspending. [25]
We also considered other control variables, such as the institution's
level  of  expenditures,  fraction  of  the  year  participating  in  the
experiment and number of potential users, but their contribution to
explaining  the  forecast  error  was  not  statistically  significant.  The
between-group  variation  and  the  1999  improvement  account  for
about 85% of the variation, as measured by the R2 statistic.
Decisions about specific titles
In addition to comparing the total number of subscriptions for an
institution  with  the  optimal  number,  we  can  also  identify  the
optimality for each particular title subscribed. We calculate, based on
observed usage and prices,  which titles an institution with perfect
foresight  should  have  obtained  through  traditional  subscriptions,
and call  this  the  optimal  set.  Then we  calculate  two measures  of
actual behavior. First, we determine which titles in the optimal set an
institution  actually  purchased.  Second,  we  determine  which
traditional subscription titles the institution would have been better
off foregoing because actual access would have been less expensive
using other available access products.
In Table 6.13 we present our analysis of the traditional subscription
titles  selected  by  institutions.  There  is  wide  variation  both  in  the
percent of purchased subscriptions that are in the optimal set, and in
the percent of journals in the optimal set to which the institution did
not  subscribe, [26]  Overall,  there  is  substantial  opportunity  for
improvement.  This  is  not  a  criticism  of  institutional  decisions.
Rather,  it  indicates  the  opportunity  for  improved  purchasing
decisions if  libraries obtain the type of detailed usage information
PEAK provided.
We do generally see better decisions in 1999. However, in both years
a rather large percentage of subscribed journals were not accessed at
all.
















3 1998 907 53.3% 3.4% 92.5%
10 1998 23 0.0% 100.0% 65.2%
11 1998 663 3.6% 0.0% 84.5%
12 1998 22 0.0% 100.0% 81.8%
13 1998 205 0.5% 0.0% 12.7%
14 1998 72 0.0% N/A 36.1%
15 1998 102 0.0% N/A 48.0%
3 1999 907 75.0% 7.7% 97.0%
10 1999 23 13.0% 76.9% 65.2%
13 1999 205 29.8% 62.6% 86.8%
14 1999 72 0.0% N/A 20.8%
15 1998 102 10.8% 8.3% 84.3%
Dynamic Optimal Choice
Access  product  purchasing  decisions  made  by  institutions  have  a
profound impact on the costs faced by users, and thus on the realized
demand  for  access.  Therefore,  in  deciding  what  access  products,
electronic  or  otherwise,  to  purchase,  an institution must  not  only
consider the demand realized for a particular level of user cost, but
also  what  would  be  demanded  at  differing  levels  of  user  costs.
Likewise,  in  our  determination  of  the  optimal  bundle  of  access
products, we should not take the given set of accesses as fixed and
exogenous. As a simple example, let us assume that a subscription to
a given journal requires 25 accesses in order to pay for itself. Now
assume  that  the  institution  in  question  did  not  subscribe  to  that
journal, and that 20 tokens were used to access articles in the time
period.  At  first  look,  it  appears as  though the institutions did the
optimal thing. Let us assume, however, that we know that accesses
would increase by 50%, to 30, when no password is required. It now
appears as though the institution should have subscribed, since the
reduced user costs would stimulate sufficient demand to justify these
higher costs.
Table  6.14:  Optimal  bundles  with  barrier-free  access:  Selected
institutions













3 1998 500 556 1099 1130 9.39% 12.53%
3 1999 737 805 236 146 4.85% 7.46%
11 1998 24 31 2532 3019 21.11% 21.09%
12 1998 1 1 254 287 17.76% 13.67%
14 1999 0 0 168 249 48.21% 48.21%
15 1999 12 17 242 366 47.56% 60.36%
In Table 6.4 we reported results that allow us to estimate how much
usage  would  increase  if  no  passwords  or  other  user  costs  were
incurred. We now calculate the product purchases that would have
optimally matched the usage demand that we estimate would have
occurred  had  the  library  removed  or  absorbed  all  user  costs.  We
report  the  results  in  Table  6.14. [27]  For  most  institutions,  the
optimal number of journal subscriptions increases, because greater
usage  makes  the  subscription  more  valuable.  In  general,  the
estimated institution cost of the optimal bundle would not increase
greatly to accommodate the usage increase that would follow from
eliminating user costs. Although we cannot quantify a dollar value
for  the  eliminated  user  costs  (because  they  include  nonpecuniary
costs such as those from requiring a password), we show in the last
two columns that  the  modest  institutional  cost  increase  would be
accompanied  by  comparable  or  larger  increases  in  usage.  The
greatest cost increase (48%) occurs for the institutions (14 and 15) at
which  generalized  subscription  tokens  were  not  available  and  the
institution did not directly subsidize the per-article fee, i.e. at those
institutions  where  users  faced  the  highest  user  costs.  Thus,  the
higher institutional costs should be weighed against high savings in
user costs (including money spent on per-article purchases).
6.7 Conclusion
Experience from the early years of electronic commerce indicates that
low user costs—nonpecuniary as well as pecuniary—are critical to the
success of electronic distribution systems. In the PEAK experiment, we
have  evidence  that  for  the  information  goods  in  question,  these
non-pecuniary costs are of the same magnitude as significant pecuniary
costs. In a two-tiered decision problem such as in this project, where
intermediaries  determine  the  user  costs  required  to  access  specific
content,  both  the  quantity  and  composition  of  demand  is  greatly
affected by users' reactions to these costs. Therefore any determination
of  what  the intermediary "ought"  to do must  take these effects  into
account. Furthermore, we have initial evidence that suggests that users
who come to expect information at zero marginal cost are far less likely
to  pay  these  non-monetary  costs  when  requested  than  their
counterparts who expect these costs. This finding is of great import to
both  those  who  design  electronic  information  delivery  and  pricing
systems as well  as any intermediaries controlling information access
and costs.
In the second part of the chapter we investigated the extent to which
libraries could have improved their purchasing decisions if  they had
detailed usage information that provided a reliable basis for forecasting
future usage. We found that with perfect foresight about next year's
usage,  libraries  could  have  substantially  reduced their  expenditures.
They could also have substantially improved the match between what
titles they purchased and what articles users want to access.
We then linked the two sets of analyses by showing how much greater
usage would be if the library absorbed or removed the pecuniary and
non-pecuniary user costs we observed. The result would be substantial
increases in usage. The library expenditures would have to increase by
comparable  percentage  amounts;  however  the  institution  should
recognize  that  these  costs  would  be  offset  by  the  lower  user  costs
incurred by its  constituents,  and the net cost,  if  any,  would support
substantial increases in usage.
Notes
1.  See  MacKie-Mason  and  Riveros  (2000)  for  a  discussion  of  the
economics of electronic publishing.
2. See Bonn et al. (this volume) and Hunter (this volume) for accounts
of the genesis of this project.
3.  Kingma  (this  volume)  provides  a  good  discussion  of  the  role  of
library as intermediary.
4.  As  we  further  discuss  below,  user  cost  may  include  several
components  only  one  of  which  is  a  standard  price.  The  other
components  may include,  for  example,  time and inconvenience.  We
expect  these  user  costs,  taken  together,  and  not  price  alone,  to
determine usage.
5. 120 is the approximate average number of articles in a traditional
printed journal for a given year. We refer to this bundle of options to
access articles as a set of tokens, with one token used for each article
added to the generalized subscription during the year.
6. For example, a Green institution first decides how many generalized
subcriptions  to  purchse  (if  any).  Users  then  access  articles  using
generalized  subscription  "tokens"  at  zero  pecuniary  cost  until  the
tokens  run  out,  and  thereafter  pay  a  fee  per  article  for  additional
articles. The library determines how many articles (not which articles)
are available at the two different prices.
7. To access PEAK from other IP addresses, users entered a password.
Once access was granted, all content in these categories was available
without further user cost.
8. In the first eight months of the experiment, users paid with a First
Virtual VPIN account, rather than with a credit card. Because a VPIN
was  an  unfamiliar  product,  the  non-pecuniary  costs  were  probably
higher than for credit card usage, although formally the user needed to
undertake the same steps.
9. When the user accessed an article for which per-article payment was
required, the institution was automatically billed by the PEAK service.
10. Paid content is metered content not including article in journals to
which an institution purchased a traditional subscription.
11.  Formally,  Normalized  Paid  Access  is  equal  to
,  where  Apaid  is  the  total  number  of  paid
accesses, Aunmetered the total number of unmetered accesses, and Scale
is equal total number of free accesses divided by the total number of
accesses of free content in journals to which the institution does not
have a traditional subscription. We multiply by Scale because the more
that accesses are covered by traditional subscriptions, the less likely a
user is to require paid access. Scaling by access to unmetered content
also  controls  for  different  overall  usage  intensity  (due  to  different
numbers  of  active  users,  differences  in  the  composition  of  users,
differences in research orientation, differences in user education about
PEAK,  etc.).  Unmetered  accesses  proxies  for  the  number  of  user
sessions, and therefore our statistic is an estimate of paid accesses per
session.
12.  Only  28%  of  unmetered  accesses  from  Red  group  users  were
password authenticated.  This suggests that a large majority of  users
attempting  to  access  paid  content  would  not  already  be  password
authenticated.  For  these  users,  the  need  to  password  authenticate
would truly be a marginal cost.
13. The Elsevier journal catalogue is especially strong in these subject
areas,  so  we  expect  differences  in  usage  when  the  subject  area
concentration of the user community differs.
14. In only two cases were credit cards are required, and both were at
the same institution.
15.  Recall  that  all  users  at  an  institution  could  access,  without
password  authentication,  any  article  previously  purchased  by  that
institution  with  a  generalized  token.  For  articles  purchased  on  a
per-article basis, only the individual who purchased the article could
view it without further monetary cost.
16.  The  libraries  at  institutions  3  and  11  processed  these  requests
electronically, through PEAK, while the library at institution 9 did not
and thus incurred greater processing delays.
17. In addition, institution 6 is a corporate institution. It is possible
that  its  users'  budgetary  constraints  were  not  as  binding  as  those
associated with academic institutions.
18.  This  phenomenon  was  widely  discussed—though  not,  to  our
knowledge,  sufficiently  demonstrated—during  the  early  years  of
widespread  public  access  on  the  Internet.  Many  businesses  and
commentators  asked whether  users  would pay for  any content  after
being accustomed to getting most Internet-delivered information for
free.
19. For an excellent discussion of the collection development officer's
problem, see Haar (1999)
20. The percentage of articles read through June 1999 for academic
institutions  participating  in  PEAK  ranged  from  .12%  to  6.40%.  An
empirical study by King and Griffiths (1995) found that about 43.6% of
users who read a journal read five or fewer articles from the journal
and 78% of the readers read 10 or fewer articles.
21. Project implementation delays exacerbated the demand forecasting
problem.  For  example,  none  of  the  institutions  in  the  Blue  Group
started the project until the third quarter of the year.
22. With print publications and some electronic products libraries may
be  willing  to  spend  more  on  full  journal  subscriptions  to  create
complete archival collections. All  access to PEAK materials ended in
August 1999, however, so archival value should not have played a role
in decision making.
23.  As  1999  PEAK  access  is  for  8  months,  the  number  of  1999
generalized subscriptions was multiplied by 1.5  for  comparison with
1998.
24. One of the institutions that increased token purchases despite over
purchasing  in  1998 was  more  foresightful  than  our  simple  learning
model: its usage increased so much that it ran out of tokens less than
six months into the final eight-month period of the experiment.
25. E.g., the Green group had average overspending of about 55% so a
36-point change represents a shift from about 73% in 1998 to about
37% in 1999.
26. The calculations in the two columns are independent and should
not  generally  sum to one.  The first  column indicates  the percent  of
titles  that  were  subscribed  that  should  have  been subscribed  (given
perfect foresight). A high percent means there were not many specific
titles  subscribed that  should not  have been.  However,  this  does not
indicate that a library subscribed to most of the titles that it  should
have. A library that subscribes to zero journals will get 100% on this
measure: no journals were subscribed that should not have been. The
second column addresses  this  question:  what  percent  of  those titles
that  should  have  been  subscribed  were  missed?  The  two  columns
correspond to Type I and Type II error in classical statistical theory.
The  first  should  be  high,  and  the  second  low  if  the  institution  is
forecasting well (and following our simple model of "optimal" practice).
27. We performed the calculation for those institutions for which we
have a good estimate of the user cost effect (see Table 6.4),  and for
which there were enough article accesses for meaningful estimation.
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